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The Complex Response of Monetary 
Policy to Asset Prices.
Ram Kharel (Brunel)
Chris Martin (Brunel)
Costas Milas (Keele)There is a large literature on monetary policy and asset 
prices.
There are 2 aspects to this literature:
•do monetary policymakers respond to asset prices?
•should monetary policymakers respond to asset prices?
This paper addresses the first of these.We consider 3 issues:
•does monetary policy respond to asset prices or to asset 
price misalignment?
i.e. do policymakers always respond to changes in asset 
prices irrespective of whether these changes 
represent changes in the equilibrium real exchange rate 
or changes relative to the underlying equilibrium?  The 
existing literature assumes that they do, but this seems at 
least debatable
•does the response of monetary policy to asset prices vary 
according to asset price misalignment?
i.e. do policymakers respond more vigorously to asset 
prices when misalignment is greater?  Indeed, do they 
only respond to asset prices when misalignment is 
sufficiently strong? •does the response of policymakers to inflation or output 
depend on asset price misalignment?
e.g. do policymakers respond less vigorously to inflation 
when exchange rate over-valuation creates additional 
downward pressure inflation?We find clear evidence of all 3 effects.  In particular:
•Models in which policymakers only respond to asset price 
misalignment outperform models in which they respond to all 
asset price movements 
•Policymakers only respond to asset prices (in this paper, 
exchange rates) when there is significant  misalignment
•The response to inflation is more muted when there is 
significant  exchange rate misalignment (although this effect 
is relatively small).  This implies, for example, that the 
increase in interest rates in response to excessive inflation is
moderated when the real exchange rate is significantly 
overvalued; this is plausible since the overvaluation also 
creates downward pressure on inflation.Addressing these issues requires a more sophisticated 
model than the usual Taylor rule.  We use a 4-regime smooth 
transition model in which the behaviour of policymakers’ is 
allowed to differ between 4 distinct regimes, depending on 
whether inflation is close to the target and whether real 
exchange rate misalignment is large or small.  
We estimate our model using data from the inflation targeting 
regime that began after 1992.
For the regimes, we find
•The economy is in the inner inflation regime if expected 
inflation is between 2% and 2.75%
•The economy is in the inner exchange rate regime if the real 
exchange rate is no more than 4.4% above equilibrium or no 
less than 5.1% below equilibrium.In each regime, the behaviour of policymakers is described 
by a regime-specific augmented Taylor rule in which interest 
rates can respond to inflation relative to the target, the output 
gap, real exchange rate misalignment and a foreign (in our 
case, US) interest rate.  
The complexity of the model prevents us considering 
responses to a wider set of asset prices, such as stock prices 
or house prices.
We find:
•Policymakers only respond to output if both inflation and the 
exchange rate are in their inner regimes.
•Policymakers only respond to inflation or the the real 
exchange when these variables are in their outer regimes.  •Policymakers also respond to the foreign interest rate; we 
find that a 1% increase in the US rate increases UK rates by 
0.43%; this response does not depend on regimes or other 
variables.
•(as explained above) The response to inflation in the outer 
inflation regime is smaller if there is also significant 
misalignment of the real exchange rate These findings may help explain the confused state of the 
existing literature.  
Some papers find that monetary policy responds to the 
exchange rate but not the foreign interest rate; other papers 
find the opposite.  These studies use Taylor rules, which 
assume a constant response to policy variables.  Since our 
findings suggest that these strengths of these responses 
actually vary over time, the diversity of findings in the 
literature is not surprising.Empirical studies of the impact of asset prices on 
monetary policy typically use an extension of the 
Taylor rule, eg
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In this model, the desired nominal interest rate (i*) depends 
on the equilibrium nominal interest rate, the rate of inflation 
(π) relative to the inflation target (πT) expected for time (t+jπ), 
the output gap expected for time (t+jy), the foreign interest 
rate (if)expected for time (t+jif) and the real exchange rate  
(e) (defined as the real price of domestic currency in terms of 
foreign currency) expected at at time (t+je)The model is typically closed by assuming that the 
observed nominal interest adjusts towards the desired 
nominal rate with a lag (Woodford, 2003), so
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Estimates of this model using UK quarterly data for the 
inflation targeting regime, 1992Q4-2005Q2, are 
presented in column (I) of Table 1) 
After initial experimentation we chose (t+jπ)=(t+jy)=1 and 
(t+jif)=(t+je)=0, so  policymakers respond to inflation and  
the output gap expected in the next period (our model 
thus exhibits expected inflation targeting as proposed by 
Svensson, 1997).  The model we estimate is therefore
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We measure i using the 3-month Treasury Bill Rate, π as 
the year-on-year proportional change in the retail price index, 
y as the the proportional deviation of output from its 
underlying (HP) trend, if is the US 3-month effective funds 
rate and e is the real effective exchange rate (see the data 
appendix for details of data sources and definitions).This simple model assumes that policymakers respond to all 
movements in the real exchange rate.  
However, they may not.  They may respond differently to 
movements in the underlying equilibrium real exchange rate 
than to temporary deviations of the exchange rate from that 
equilibrium; they may also respond differently to larger 
misalignments.     
Figure 1 plots the real exchange rate and deviations of the 
real exchange rate from its’ underlying trend (denoted as the 
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Figure 1: Real exchange rate and Real exchange rate 
gapThe real exchange rate appreciates sharply and permanently 
in 1997.
By contrast, the appreciation of the real exchange rate gap in 
1997 is only temporary since the data suggests that the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate is permanent.
Members of the MPC appear to have differed as to how to 
respond to the 1997 appreciation.  Part of this debate 
concerns whether the 1997 appreciation was permanent.  A 
recent speech by Steve Nickell argues that the appreciation 
was indeed permanent and that policymakers realised this 
within 18 months; this is consistent with our graph of the 
exchange rate gapColumn (ii) of table 1) present estimates of the modified 
model
11 1 1 1
11
(1 ){ ( )
(* ) }
T
ti t i t t y t t
f
if t t e t t t
ii iE E y
Ei E e e
π ρρ ρ π π ρ
ρρ
−− + − +
−−
=+ −+ − +
++ −
where e* is the equilibrium real exchange rate.  
This model assumes that policymakers respond to the real 
exchange rate gap and so do not respond to shifts in the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. (However the model does not 
as yet allow policymakers only to respond to large rather than 
small misalignments)Table 1
Estimates of linear policy rules
GMM estimates, 1992Q4-2005Q2
(I) (ii)
respond to real exchange rate real exchange rate gap
ρI 0.825 (0.014)* 0.815 (0.047)*
ρπ 1.837 (0.166)* 1.272 (0.317)*
ρy 1.508 (0.304)* 0.925 (0.500)**
ρif 0.529 (0.036)* 0.447 (0.062)*
ρe 0.160 (0.310) 0.084(0.037)*
se. 0.305 0.295The estimates in column (i) of table 1) reveal that the real 
exchange rate is insignificant, but that there is a strong 
response to the foreign interest rate.  These findings are 
similar to those in a recent paper by Adams, Cobham and 
Girardin (OBES, 2005)
The estimates in column (ii) of table 1) reveal a significant 
effect from the real exchange rate gap in a model that fits the 
data better than that in column (i).
This provides some evidence that policymakers respond to 
the real exchange rate gap.  This answers the first question 
posed at the start.The Taylor rule models considered so far make two key 
assumptions:
- there is a constant response to movements in the 
explanatory variables
- the response to one variable does not depend on the value 
of other variables.
We therefore consider a model that relaxes these 
assumptions.We consider the 4-regime Multiple Regime Smooth Transition 
model:
*
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depending on whether inflation is close to the target or not 
and on whether the real exchange rate is close to equilibrium 
or not. 
The model has 4 regimes:
•regime 1: inflation close to target and exchange rate 
misalignment low
the behaviour of policymakers in this regime is described 
by the (augmented) Taylor rule M1.
•regime 2: inflation close to target but exchange rate 
misalignment high
the behaviour of policymakers in this regime is described 
by the Taylor rule M2.•regime 3: inflation not close to target but exchange rate 
misalignment low
the behaviour of policymakers in this regime is described 
by the Taylor rule M3.
•regime 4: inflation not close to target and exchange rate 
misalignment high
the behaviour of policymakers in this regime is described 
by the Taylor rule M4.
The (possibly asymmetric) boundaries to these regimes are 
described by the tau parameters, which we are able to 
estimate.•the model simplifies to the Taylor rule above if behaviour 
does not differ  between regimes (ie kjn=kjm, m≠n, for all j)
•there can be different responses to inflation in the inner and 
outer inflation regimes; we might expect a larger response in 
the outer regime (ie k31>k11, k41>k21)
•similarly, there can be different responses to exchange rate 
misalignment in the inner and outer exchange rate regimes; 
we might expect a larger response in the outer regime (ie
k23>k13, k43>k33)
•the response to inflation differs according to the exchange 
rate if k11≠k21 and k31≠k41•we might also consider regimes for the output gap; however 
this would imply an 8-regime model, which is computationally 
infeasible on a sample of this size.
•Tentative estimates suggested that replacing one of the 
existing regimes with an output regime did not improve the 
model
Clearly, estimating such a complex model  on a relatively 
short span of data is difficult.
Fortunately, initial estimates suggested a set of restrictions 
that were acceptable to the data and greatly simplified the 
model.  These restrictions were
•policymakers only respond to the output gap in regime 1, 
when inflation is close to target and exchange rate 
misalignment is low (ie k22=k32=k42=0)
•the response to the foreign interest rate is the same in all 
regimes (ie k14=k24=k34=k44)
•there is no response to inflation when inflation is in the inner
inflation regime (ie k11=k21=0)
•there is no response to the exchange rate in the inner 
exchange rate regime (ie k13=k33=0)Table 2
Estimates of 4-regime model of monetary policy
GMM estimates, 1992Q4-2005Q2
- Regime 1 (inflation close to target; exchange rate misalignment low)
output gap (k12) 5.829 (0.204)*
- Regime 2 (inflation close to target; exchange rate misalignment high)
exchange rate gap (k23) 0.062 (0.01)*
- Regime 3 (inflation not close to target; exchange rate misalignment low)
inflation (k31) 2.845 (0.100)*
- Regime 4 (inflation not close to target; exchange rate misalignment high)
inflation (k41) 2.611 (0.080)*
exchange rate gap (k43) 0.062 (0.01)*
continues…….Table 2
Estimates of 4-regime model of monetary policy
GMM estimates, 1992Q4-2005Q2  (cont)
- Common to all regimes:
lagged interest rate (ρ) 0.854 (0.004)*
foreign interest rate 0.361 (0.009)*
-inflation regime boundaries
1.978 (0.038)*  
2.764 (0.071)*
- real exchange rate regime boundaries
-5.112 (0.107)*
4.368 (0.248)*
s.e. 0.233In terms of the two remaining questions posed at the start, 
these estimates imply
•policymakers only respond to large real exchange rate 
misalignments.
interest rates are unresponsive to misalignments greater 
than -5.11% and less than 4.37%; these boundaries are 
asymmetric, as there is greater tolerance of an over-
valued exchange rate (possibly because over-valued 
exchange rates put downward pressure on inflation) • the response of inflation does depend on the exchange rate.
The response to inflation when both inflation and 
exchange rates are in the outer regime is 2.61; the 
response when only inflation is in the outer regime is 2.85 
(a significant difference). This is probably explained by the 
additional downward pressure on inflation caused by 
exchange rate over-valuation and the policy response. It is also worth noting that
•interest rates are unresponsive to inflation when expected 
inflation is between 1.98% and 2.76%; these boundaries are 
asymmetric w.r.t the inflation target of 2.5%, as there is 
greater tolerance of low inflation than high inflation
•the model fits the data better than the augmented Taylor 
rules in Table 1
•the restrictions that simplify this model to the Taylor rule 
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This shows inflation relative to the thresholds; the UK was in 
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This shows the real exchange rate gap relative to the 
thresholds; the real exchange rate was significantly under-
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This shows the pattern of regimes over time






Regime 4: blue 
circleCrudely
1992-3: regime 4: inflation too high, exchange rate under-
valued
1994-5:  regime 1; no problem with inflation or exchange 
rate 
1996-7: regime 4: inflation too high, exchange rate under-
valued
1998-9: mixed, but some time in regime 3; inflation OK but 
exchange rate over-valued
2000-1: mixed, but some time in regime 2; exchange rate 
OK but inflation too high
2002-:  regime 1; no problem with inflation or exchange rate Robustness checks
This is work in progress, but we have done some checks:
•Some authors eg (Gali et al, JME, 1999, Chadha, Sarno and 
Valente, 2004) argue that real marginal cost provides a better 
measure of the welfare cost of deviations from equilibrium 
output and that policymakers respond to this rather than the 
output gap (this issue is hotly debated in the literature on the
New Keynesian Phillips curve).  We found no evidence for 
this.
•Using the short-term Euro area interest rate as an alternative 
to the US rate did not affect our conclusions.  •An alternative model with just 2 regimes, for inflation, 
provides a statistical fit that is just as good as the 4-regime 
model above.  In this model, policymakers only respond to 
real exchange rate misalignment when inflation is in the outer 
regime.  It is hard to give a rationalisation for this finding, so 
we prefer the 4-regime model Conclusions
We have estimated a sophisticated 4-regime smooth 
transition model of the UK for the post-1992 inflation targeting 
period. We have found: 
•monetary policy responds to misalignment rather than the 
real exchange rate itself
•monetary policymakers only respond to large real exchange 
rate misalignments
•the response of policymakers to inflation depends on real 
exchnage rate misalignment